Nouwen's Puzzle and a Scalar Semantics for Obligations, Needs, and Desires by Lassiter, Daniel
Proceedings of SALT 21: 694–711, 2011
Nouwen’s Puzzle and a Scalar Semantics for Obligations, Needs,
and Desires∗
Daniel Lassiter
Stanford University
Abstract Nouwen (2010a,b) presents a puzzle involving the interaction of degree
expressions and modals: a class of apparently unremarkable sentences expressing
minimum and maximum requirements, obligations, desires, etc. are predicted to be
trivially false or undefined, or receive otherwise incorrect truth-conditions. I suggest
that the puzzle can be resolved if we treat the affected modals not as universal
quantifiers over possible worlds but instead as scalar expressions which map propo-
sitions to points on a scale of expected utility. Independent arguments indicate that
these modals are scalar, non-monotonic, and information-sensitive — facts which
are highly problematic for quantificational theories, but predicted immediately by
the proposed scalar semantics. With no additional modification, this semantics
also predicts the correct truth-conditions for Nouwen’s examples, modulo some
subtleties involving epistemic interpretations of minimum and maximum operators.
These conclusions provide additional evidence in support of previous work arguing
that the semantics of obligation and desire should be built around scales rather than
quantification over possible worlds.
Keywords: Minimum and maximum requirements, gradability, modality, deontic modals,
desire verbs, scalar modals
1 Nouwen’s Puzzle
Young Sammy wants to be tall when he grows up, but not too tall. Here are some
reasonable desires he might have:
(1) a. The minimum height that Sammy wants to be when he grows up is 6′.
b. The maximum height that Sammy wants to be when he grows up is 6′8′′.
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These are fairly unremarkable desires, but — as Nouwen (2010a,b) notes — standard
assumptions about the semantics of degree expressions and modals would lead us to
expect that Sammy could not consistently hold these desires, or else that they would
mean something very different from what they in fact do mean.
The purpose of this paper is to discern which of the standard assumptions needs
to be modified, and how. I’ll argue that the problem can to a large extent be traced
to the assumption that modals like should and want denote universal quantifiers
over some set of possible worlds, and argue for an alternative which gets the truth-
conditions of sentences like (1) right without making any radical changes to the
semantics of degree expressions. As it turns out, this alternative has a good deal of
independent motivation, some of which will be discussed in §2 below.
1.1 The Problem
Nouwen (2010a,b) points out that, on standard assumptions about the meanings
of modals and degree expressions, (2a) ought to mean something like (2b) (where
min(D) = ιd ∈D[∀d′ ∈D ∶ d ≤ d′]).
(2) a. The minimum height that Sammy wants to be when he grows up is 6′.
b. min(λd.∀w ∈Acc ∶ Sammy is at least d-tall) = 6′
If numerals have an “at least” semantics (e.g. von Stechow 1984; Heim 2001; Hackl
2001), no one could have a desire like this: (2b) is trivially false because, in every
world in which Sammy is 6′ tall, he is also 5′ tall, 4′ tall, 3′ tall, etc. No matter
what his dreams may be, the right side of “=” should be zero, or else (2b) should
be undefined (if we think that zero is not on the height scale). Of course, what (2a)
actually says is quite sensible: he wants to be at least 6′ tall, and hopefully taller.
One alternative is an “exactly” semantics for numerals. Recently a number
of authors — even some staunch neo-Griceans — have concluded that numerals
are ambiguous between an “at least” and an “exactly” meaning (Horn 1992, 2006;
Geurts 2006; Nouwen 2010a). On this approach, (2a) can also be interpreted as:
(3) min(λd.∀w ∈Acc ∶ Sammy is exactly d-tall) = 6′
(3) does no better than (2b) at capturing the truth-conditions of (2a), though. There is
no minimum degree such that Sammy is exactly that tall in every world compatible
with his desires, unless he is the same height in every such world; so (3) should
presuppose that Sammy has a single precise desired height, and entail that this
height is exactly 6′. This is not what the sentence means either: (2a) leaves open the
possibility that Sammy’s desires would be satisfied if he were 6′2′′.
The puzzle is not particular to want or to minimum; it arises with various
expressions of desire and obligation and a range of degree minimizers. For example:
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(4) a. The smallest amount of butter that you should use in a pie is 150 grams.
b. The minimum number of dishes that you must bring to the potluck is 2.
c. The minimum height that is required to ride on this ride is 4 feet.
d. The least number of children that I want to have is 3.
If should, want, required, and must are universal quantifiers over accessible worlds,
all of the sentences in (4) should be trivially false or presupposition failures. On
the at least interpretation, this is because any world in which you use 150 grams of
butter is also a world in which you use 50 grams, 10 grams, 1 gram, etc., and these
numbers are smaller than 150; likewise having three children entails having two and
having one, and being four feet tall entails being three feet tall, two feet tall, and
one foot tall. On the exactly interpretation, this is because the amount in question is
wrongly predicted to be an upper bound. Not only is an upper-bounding inference
not present, but these sentences clearly suggest the opposite, namely that it would be
a good idea to use more than 150 grams of butter (that is the least that will allow you
to still make a decent pie), or that the speaker wants to have at least three children.
The semantics also gives us the wrong truth-conditions for sentences expressing
maximum desires such as (1b), repeated as (5a). This sentence has the intuitive inter-
pretation that Sammy wants to be no taller than 6′8′′; but the predicted interpretation
is either that he wants to be at least 6′8′′ (5b) or exactly 6′8′′ (5c).
(5) a. The maximum height that Sammy wants to be when he grows up is 6′8′′.
b. max(λd.∀w ∈Acc ∶ Sammy is at least d-tall) = 6′8′′
c. max(λd.∀w ∈Acc ∶ Sammy is exactly d-tall) = 6′8′′
These are clearly not the right meanings for these sentences. The puzzle also arises
for a variety of maximality operators and modals, for instance:
(6) a. The maximum amount of paint that you need to use to paint this room is
three cans (but you might be able to do it with less).
b. The greatest portion of your diet that should be composed of high-fat
foods is 15 .
The clear cases of the Puzzle involve deontic, bouletic, and teleological uses
of modals such as should, ought, want, need, must, require, and have to which are
usually translated as universal quantifiers over worlds. I will abbreviate this class
of expressions as D-MODALS, and will occasionally use D as a placeholder for the
denotations of these expressions in formulae.1
1 It is not totally clear whether Nouwen’s Puzzle also affects epistemic modals. Suppose I have been
assigned to provide surveillance for a building. I have no idea who was inside when I arrived, but
I have watched seven people enter the building and no one has left. The question is whether (20)
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1.2 Plan of Attack
There are three obvious ways that we could try to deal with Nouwen’s Puzzle.
A) Find a new semantics for degree expressions;
B) Find a new semantics for the affected modals;
C) Do both (A) and (B).
In this paper I will mostly pursue option (B), arguing that we can make a good
deal of progress on this problem by incorporating an independently motivated
alternative to standard semantics on which modals like want and should are scalar
and — crucially — non-monotonic. This is possible even while maintaining a fairly
simple analysis of degree expressions.
In addition, there is an empirical argument for thinking that the modal semantics
is the primary culprit: similar examples with universally quantified DPs clearly do
not produce similar readings. That is, (7a) does not have an interpretation analogous
to (7b) with either minimum or maximum.
(7) a. The minimum/maximum amount that everyone worked was 40 hours.
# “The person who worked the least/most worked 40 hours.”
b. The minimum/maximum amount that Bill wants to work is 40 hours.✓ “In the world in which he works the least/most, Bill works 40 hours.”
If we could somehow modify the degree semantics so that modals interpreted as
quantifiers over worlds produce the desired readings for (7b), we would need some
sort of mechanism preventing similar readings from arising in examples like (7a).
I don’t have any idea what such a mechanism would look like, or how it could be
motivated. However, if the affected modals are not universal quantifiers at all (as I
will argue), the fact that (7a) and (7b) differ in this respect is not troubling.2
describes this situation well:
(1) ?? The minimum number of people that must be in the building is seven.
Nouwen (2010b) suggests that it does not, although I have found speakers who find this description
marginally acceptable, as well as a handful of naturally-occurring examples. My suspicion is that,
to the extent that this description is acceptable, it is not a genuine case of Nouwen’s Puzzle but due
to a separate phenomenon whereby minimum and maximum operators can receive an epistemic
interpretation; see §4.2 below.
2 This is, incidentally, why I will not consider in detail the effects of switching to an interval-based
semantics for degrees here (as in Schwarzschild & Wilkinson 2002). This approach has various
motivations, and it might be able to avoid some of the problems for the interaction of D-modals with
the simple degree semantics noted above. To the extent that it does, though, it would seem to predict
that universally quantified DPs should do the same (and epistemic modals as well). Interval semantics
may well provide part of the full solution, though.
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I want to be clear, however, that I am not actually arguing that the semantics for
degrees that I’m using here is correct. In fact, this semantics is probably in need
of refinement, and there is no shortage of proposals available. However, I don’t
think it will be possible to deal with Nouwen’s Puzzle by modifying the degree
semantics without also adopting a modal semantics along the lines I’ll propose here.
To keep the paper to a manageable length, then, I will settle for showing that the
simplistic assumptions about degree semantics that I am making are not the root of
the problem: first and foremost, we need a new semantics for D-modals.
2 Inferences, Information, & Scales: Problems for Quantificational Theories
This section presents three types of data which are problematic for standard accounts
of the semantics of D-modals which treat them as quantifiers over possible worlds.
• Quantificational theories predict that D-modals and universal quantifiers
should license the same inferences. Several examples call this prediction
into question, and in particular, the assumption that D-modals are upward
monotonic. I’ll suggest that they are in fact non-monotonic.
• D-modals are sensitive to fine-grained probabilistic information in a way
that is difficult to capture in quantificational theories.
• Most D-modals participate in degree modification and comparison structures,
a fact which strongly suggest that their semantics is — like other expressions
which have these properties — built on scales.
These data motivate the scalar semantics to be proposed in the next section, which
gives a straightforward answer to the three problems.
2.1 D-Modals are Not Universal Quantifiers
Many classic “paradoxes of deontic logic” involve divergences between the inference
patterns which are intuitively valid with universal quantifiers and those which are
intuitively valid with strong deontic modals. Here I will mention two inference
patterns which would be valid if D-modals were universal quantifiers, but admit of
counter-examples; Lassiter (2011) discusses several more. In the next section I’ll
show that the counter-examples are predicted by the scalar alternative I’ll propose.
2.1.1 Professor Procrastinate
As a consequence of the upward monotonicity of the universal quantifier in its
nuclear scope, the inference from ∀x(φ ∧ψ) to ∀x(φ) is valid. However, Jackson
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(1985); Jackson & Pargetter (1986) argue that the inference from ought(φ ∧ψ) to
ought(φ) admits of counter-examples, which suggests again that ought is not a
universal quantifier. Jackson & Pargetter (1986) describe the case as follows:
Prof. Procrastinate is invited to review a book on which he is the
only fully qualified specialist on the planet. Procrastinate’s notable
character flaw, however, is his inability to bring projects to comple-
tion. In particular, if Procrastinate accepts to review the book, it is
extremely likely that he will not end up writing the review. In the
eyes of the editor, and of the whole scientific community, this is the
worst possible outcome. If Procrastinate declines, someone else will
write the review — someone less qualified, but more reliable.
According to Jackson & Pargetter, (8a) is true in this scenario, but (8b) is false:
(8) a. Professor Procrastinate ought to accept and write the review.
b. Professor Procrastinate ought to accept the review.
Intuitively, the reason for this is that ought in (8b) takes into account not only the
good worlds in which Prof. Procrastinate accepts and writes, but also what is much
more likely if he accepts, that he will not write. Since this is the worst possible
outcome, the likelihood of its occurrence somehow outweighs the fact that the worlds
in which he accepts and writes are optimal.This example suggests that the relevant
operators simply are not universal quantifiers. (It is not too difficult to construct
similar cases with want, cf. Lassiter 2011.)
2.1.2 Chicken
Jackson (1985) argues that the inference from D(φ)∧D(ψ) to D(φ ∧ψ) admits
counter-examples, even though its universally-quantified counterpart is valid.
Attila and Genghis are driving their chariots towards each other.
If neither swerves, there will be a collision; if both swerve, there
will be a worse collision (in a different place, of course); but if one
swerves and the other does not, there will be no collision. Moreover
if one swerves, the other will not because neither wants a collision.
Unfortunately, it is also true to an even greater extent that neither
wants to be ‘chicken’; as a result what actually happens is that neither
swerves and there is a collision. (Jackson 1985: 189)
As Jackson points out, all of the following are intuitively true in this scenario:
(9) a. Atilla ought to swerve.
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b. Genghis ought to swerve.
c. It’s not the case that Atilla and Genghis ought to both swerve.
Again, it is possible to construct similar examples using want.
If ought and want are universal quantifiers ranging over a set of worlds (however
determined), it should not be possible for the judgments in (9) to be even coherent,
much less intuitively correct. This is a serious problem, since the inference from∀x(P(x))∧∀x(Q(x)) to ∀x(P(x)∧Q(x)) is of course valid.
2.2 D-Modals are Sensitive to Fine-Grained Probabilistic Information
Viewed from a certain perspective, all three of the puzzles in the last section are
instances of a broader class of puzzles for quantificational semantics of desire verbs
and deontics. The problem, in a nutshell, is that obligation and desire interact with
graded belief in a more fine-grained way than quantificational theories can capture.
To see the connection, consider: how can Prof. Procrastinate ought to accept
the review be false even though the best worlds are ones in which he does accept the
review (and writes it too)? Because, assuming that he accepts the review, there is a
high probability that he will not write it, and we will find ourselves in one of the
worst possible situations instead of one of the best. How can it be that Atilla ought
to swerve and Genghis ought to swerve, even though it would be disastrous if both
of them did? Because, as part of the story, we are told that it is highly unlikely that
either of them will in fact do what they ought. The lesson here is that, at least with
respect to ought and want, probability matters. If so, we cannot treat D-modals as
quantifiers whose domain is restricted to the best (epistemically) possible worlds.
Rather, we need some kind of mechanism which tells us how to weigh good and bad
outcomes against each other, taking probability into account in some way.
In fact this is what Goble (1996) and Levinson (2003) conclude regarding ought
and want respectively. Goble’s story, simplified considerably, goes like this. Suppose
that a doctor must choose which medicine to give to a critically ill patient, A or B. A
might produce a total cure, but will more likely kill the patient. Meanwhile B will
save the patient’s life, but will leave him slightly debilitated.
What should the doctor do? Intuition suggests that the doctor ought to choose B,
since A is very risky. However, standard quantificational semantics for ought unhesi-
tatingly recommends choosing A, because all of the best epistemically accessible
worlds in this scenario are worlds in which the doctor gives medicine A. This is
evidently the wrong recommendation. Again, the problem relies on the fact that, in
quantificational semantics, the fact that all of the best worlds are A-worlds is enough
to render true The doctor ought to give A, regardless of their improbability.
Levinson (2003) gives an example which makes the same point involving want.
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Consider the following four worlds, representing the possible outcomes I must
consider in making insurance-buying decisions as a homeowner:
(10) w1: I do not buy insurance and my home burns down
w2: I do not buy insurance and my home does not burn down
w3: I buy insurance and my home does not burn down
w4: I buy insurance and my home burns down
It seems clear that, as a homeowner, if my house burns down, I would prefer to
have fire insurance: w4 ≻ w1. I also do not like to spend money pointlessly, and
so, assuming my home does not burn down, I prefer a state in which I do not buy
insurance: w2 ≻w3. Finally, I prefer a state in which my home does not burn down
to a state in which my home burns down, no matter what: w2,w3 ≻w1,w4. The only
consistent preference order meeting these constraints is:
(11) w2 ≻w3 ≻w4 ≻w1
Assuming that w1-w4 are epistemic possibilities, we should be able to conclude that
(12) I want not to buy insurance,
since all of the top-ranked worlds in (11) are worlds in which I do not buy insurance.
But this is not an appropriate inference. Even though I would prefer not to buy
insurance if I knew that my house would not burn down, I may still want to do so
because I am uncertain whether it will. In particular, if I think that there is a decent
chance that my house will burn down at some point, I may want to buy insurance in
full knowledge that all of the worlds in which I do so are globally suboptimal.
These examples indicate that in considering what we ought to do, or what we
want to do, we cannot only look at the best worlds. Instead, whether or not I want to
or ought to buy insurance will depend on my judgment about how likely it is that
my house will burn down, as well as factors such as the cost of insurance vs. the
value of the house. Simply put, non-optimal worlds matter, and probability matters.
2.3 D-Modals are (Mostly) Gradable
On standard assumptions, gradable expressions are functions or relations between
individuals, VP meanings, propositions, etc. and an ordered set of points called
degrees which form part of a scale. The semantic mechanisms underlying universal
quantification are quite different, and do not involve degrees or scales. In particular,
if something is semantically a universal quantifier, we do not expect it to display the
core empirical characteristics of gradability — participation in degree modification
and comparison structures. If it does, we have some explaining to do.
Most of the D-modals show a fair bit of gradable behavior. The main verbs want,
need, and require are clearly gradable, displaying roughly the same behavior in this
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respect as ordinary gradable verbs such as like. (These are discussed along with
sources and further examples in Lassiter 2011: §5.)
(13) a. The members of a literary group are required to have a blazer, more than
they are required to have ever actually read a book.
b. Thus, you are very much required to have a good credit record to prove
yourself as a reliable client to the insurance providers.
(14) a. [M]any library officials want more to intimidate than to really change
an institutional culture that has squelched feedback.
b. I am an American and I want very much to travel to Cuba.
(15) a. But really emails need to be timely more than they need to be amazing.
The auxiliary should and the quasi-auxiliary ought also show limited gradability.
(16) a. [O]nce the damage is done, Constance ought to help George ... more than
she ought to help anyone else similarly situated. (Driver 1997: 853)
b. A war between Britain and the U.S. ought very much to be deprecated.
(17) a. I don’t think he [UFC fighter Phil Davis] should be compared to Rosholt
as much as he should be to Houston Alexander.3
There are two notable exceptions to the observation that D-modals are frequently
gradable: must and have to. For instance,
(18) a. ?* You must/have to leave more than John.
b. ?* Sam must/has to very much be at home.
We might conclude that these items are quantifiers while the other D-modals are
scalar. However, there is an alternative. As discussed in Lassiter 2011:§§1,6, the fact
that an expression is not gradable does not show conclusively that it does not have a
scalar semantics. Rather, what it shows is that the expression in question does not
interact with threshold-manipulating operators as gradable expressions do; this does
not tells us what the theoretical explanation for this fact is. We still have to ask on a
case-by-case basis whether there are arguments for a scalar semantics.
The most straightforward reason for thinking that all D-modals are scalar, even
if some are not gradable, is that they all take part in some or all of the other puz-
zles under consideration here — Ross’s Puzzle, Professor Procrastinate, Chicken,
information-sensitivity, and Nouwen’s Puzzle. In the next section I will propose a
unified scalar semantics for D-modals which allows us to make sense of these puz-
zles. A general solution of this type is probably not achievable within theories which
treat these expressions — including the non-gradable ones — as quantifiers over
worlds; the best we can hope for is piecemeal accounts for the various objections.
3 http://www.bloodyelbow.com/2009/12/17/1205767/ufc-signs-hot-prospect-phil-davis
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3 Scalar Semantics for D-Modals
The solution that I will advocate to the three problems just noted is a generalization
of proposals due to Goble (1996) and Levinson (2003). On this account, D-modals
are scalar expressions which place conditions on the probability-weighted average
preference of the worlds in their propositional argument. This is formally identical
to the well-known construct of expected utility (E(⋅)), though it is important to keep
in mind that the semantics does not have any commitments with respect to questions
about decision-making behavior. Rather, expected utility is simply a method for
relating preferences over worlds to preferences over propositions, albeit one that — I
will argue — has a number of empirically desirable characteristics.
3.1 Preference and Information
Preferences are often represented formally in logic and semantics as binary orders
over worlds. I will assume something slightly stronger, that preferences over worlds
are given by an interval order. Essentially, an interval order contains all of the
information in a binary order, including comparative facts about whether world w
is preferred to world w′; but it is richer in that it also contains information about
how much better w is than w′. Without going into the details of the qualitative
characteristics of interval orders, I will simply note here that every interval order can
be given an equivalent representation by a class of “admissible” measure functions
µ ∶W →R which take worlds to real numbers. This means that we can use qualitative
(order-theoretic) representations and representations using numerical measurements
interchangeably, as long as we are careful about how we relate the two; see Krantz,
Luce, Suppes & Tversky (1971); Lassiter (2011): §§2,6 for formal details and moti-
vation for using interval orders to represent preferences. In the case of preferences,
the measure functions are called utility functions and will be represented by U.
The kinds of preferences that express using natural language are typically not
preferences over individual worlds, but over sets of worlds (propositions). To give a
semantics for these items we need to define an order over propositions in terms of
the order over worlds just outlined. A simple and prima facie attractive method is:
(19) Possibilism: φ is preferred to (better than, more desirable than, ...) ψ if and
only if the highest-ranked accessible worlds in φ are preferred to (better
than, more desirable than, ...) the highest-ranked accessible worlds in ψ .4
Possibilism is assumed explicitly or implicitly in a great deal of work in logic,
semantics, and meta-ethics (see van Fraassen 1973; Jackson 1985 for critical discus-
4 Or, if there are no maximal φ -worlds, if there is a φ -world that is preferred to all ψ-worlds. The term
“Possibilism” is due to Goble (1996).
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World Treatment Outcome Utility prob(w∣Treatment)
w1 Give A Full recovery +100 .05
w2 Give A Death −100 .95
w3 Give B Partial recovery +20 1
Table 1 Utilities and probabilities in a toy model for the medicine problem.
sion). Kratzer (1981, 1991), whose theory is widely assumed in formal semantics,
builds this principle into her definition of “comparative possibility”.
As Jackson (1985); Goble (1996) point out, Possibilism encounters serious
difficulty in situations of the type that were discussed above: frequently we are
not just interested in what happens in the best worlds in a proposition, but also in
what happens in non-optimal worlds, and particular in whether we are likely to find
ourselves in good worlds or bad if the proposition is realized. In cases such as the
insurance and medicine puzzles discussed in §2.2, Possibilism clearly gives us the
wrong result: it can be desirable to buy insurance even though the best worlds in
which we do not buy insurance are better than the best worlds in which we do; and it
can be morally better to choose a safe but imperfect medicine even though the best
worlds in which we choose a risky alternative (and it happens to work) are better
than the best worlds in which we choose the safe one.
Goble’s account of the medicine puzzle starts with the idea that ought is not
a quantifier over worlds, but an operator which tests whether the expected utility
E(φ) of its argument φ is sufficiently high. Expected utility is defined in (20):
(20) E(φ) = ∑
w∈φ U(w)×prob({w}∣φ)
On this account, the preference order over propositions ranks the propositions
φ ⊆P(W) by calculating a weighted average of the desirabilities of the worlds w ∈ φ ,
where the weight of w is given by the conditional probability that w will be actual
if φ comes about.5 In effect, this means that worlds in φ which are very unlikely
to be actual if φ occurs are given proportionally little weight in the calculation of
φ ’s position in the preference order over propositions. As a result, a proposition ψ
which contains moderately desirable worlds which are fairly likely (conditional on
ψ) can outrank a proposition χ with worlds that are very good but (conditionally)
very unlikely if the latter also has undesirable worlds which are conditionally likely.
Goble suggests that ought has the denotation in (21):
5 I assume that the semantics has access to probabilistic information; see Yalcin 2010; Lassiter 2010,
Lassiter 2011: §§3-4 for detailed arguments involving grammatical and inferential characteristics of
epistemic modals. Note also that the definition in (20) is not appropriate if ∣φ ∣ is infinite. This is not a
serious limitation, but a way to simplify the mathematics a bit and clarify intuitions about what EU is.
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World Insurance? Fire? Utility Prob(w∣Insurance?)
w1 No No +20 .95
w2 Yes No +10 .95
w3 No Yes −300 .05
w4 Yes Yes −10 .05
Table 2 Utilities and probabilities in a toy model for the insurance problem.
(21) ought(φ) is true if and only if E(φ) >E(¬φ).
To see how this accounts for the medicine puzzle, suppose that the probabilities and
utilities of the various possible outcomes of the choice of medicine are as in Table 1.
(Remember that the numerical values aren’t important, just the relative differences in
magnitude.) The expected utility of giving A in this model isE(give A)= +100×.05+−100× .95 = −90, while the expected utility of giving B is E(give B) = +20×1 = 20.
Since E(give B) >E(give A), we conclude by the definition in (21) that the doctor
ought to give B. This is intuitively the correct answer, and an improvement on
theories which predict that the doctor ought to give A simply because the best worlds
in A — no matter how improbable — are better than the best worlds in B.
Levinson’s (2003) solution to the insurance puzzle has essentially the same form.
In the model sketched in Table 2, E(do not buy insurance) = +10× .95+−300× .05 =−5.5, which is less than the expected utility of buying insurance, +5× .95+ −10×
.05 = +4.25. If we suppose with Levinson that x wants φ is true iff E(φ) > E(¬φ)
according to x’s personal probability and utility functions, then x wants to buy
insurance will come out true in a model of this form. This holds despite the fact that
the worlds with highest utility are ones in which x does not buy insurance.
These are not, to be sure, the final word on the meanings of ought and want (cf.
Goble 1996; Lassiter 2011 for refinements). However, these examples illustrate the
fact that an expected utility semantics for ought and want explains why probabilistic
information matters in inferences involving these modals, and that this semantics is
capable of returning intuitively correct predictions about specific cases.
3.2 Inferences and Scalarity
If want and ought place conditions on expected utility, it is reasonable to hypothesize
that the other D-modals do the same. On this proposal, the semantic contribution of
all D-modals is to map their propositional argument φ to its expected utility E(φ)
and to compare this value to a threshold θD. So, for example, x needs φ is true if
and only if E(φ) exceeds θneed, a threshold whose value is determined by the lexical
semantics of need in interaction with the context of conversation. Skeletally:
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(22) D(φ) is true iff E(φ) ≥ θD.
We have to acknowledge at least three parameters of variation among the D-modals:
• How the preference order is established (e.g., personal preference for want
and need; moral preference for ought and should; etc.);
• What body of probabilistic information is relevant;
• How the threshold θD is located relative to other items on the scale, which
will differ depending on the modal strength (e.g., may vs. should vs. must).
For most of the rest of this paper it won’t be necessary to say much about these
parameters of variation. For the most part, the puzzles that we are considering can be
resolved simply by adopting the skeletal proposal in (22), however the other details
of the lexical semantics and context are filled in (though see fn. 6 below).
An immediate advantage of this proposal is that the three puzzles discussed in
§2.1 — involving inferences that are predicted to be valid on the standard semantics,
but admit intuitive counter-examples — are resolved by the proposal in (22). The
key fact is that expected utility is non-monotonic, essentially because different
conditional probability measures are used as weights in the calculation of E(φ) and
E(φ ∨ψ) — the first using prob(⋅∣φ), and the latter using prob(⋅∣φ ∨ψ).
Ross’ Puzzle does not arise in this semantics because E(φ) ≥ θD does not imply
E(φ ∨ψ) ≥ θD, regardless of what θD happens to be. In contrast to the standard
semantics — where the goodness of a disjunction is always equal to the goodness of
the better of the disjuncts —E(φ ∨ψ) can be less than E(φ), and will be whenever
E(ψ) < E(φ) and prob(ψ ∣φ ∨ψ) > 0. The expected utility-based semantics also
makes intuitively correct predictions about the other inferential puzzles we saw
above. Briefly, E(φ ∧ψ) ≥ θought does not imply E(φ) ≥ θought. Rather, φ can be
worse than φ ∧ψ when there are bad worlds which satisfy φ ∧¬ψ and are likely to
happen in φ occurs. This is precisely what is going on in the Professor Procrastinate
puzzle: even though worlds in which he accepts and writes the review (φ ∧ψ) are
very good, the fact that he probably will not write the review if he does accept it
means that the undesirable (φ ∧¬ψ)-worlds receive greater weight than the desirable(φ ∧ψ)-worlds in calculating E(φ). Similarly, in Chicken we know that, probably,
neither party will swerve; so the expected utility of Genghis’ swerving is high, since
the most likely scenario if he does is that Attilla will not, leading to a good outcome.
The same holds with the roles reversed, but it does not follow that we are in a good
situation if both swerve; rather, this guarantees the worst possible outcome, with the
result that E(φ) ≥ θought ∧E(ψ) ≥ θought is true but E(φ ∧ψ) ≥ θought is false. See
Lassiter 2011 for a more leisurely discussion of these cases and several others.
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Table 3 An expected utility function which validates (24a) and (24b).
The explanation of gradable behavior among the D-modals is likewise straight-
forward in this semantics: expected utility is a scale, and we can simply port over a
standard semantics for gradability and comparison. The net result is that we have
truth-conditions like these:
(23) a. Emails need to be timely more than they need to be amazing is true iff
E(Emails are timely) >E(Emails are amazing).
b. You ought very much to leave is true iff E(you leave) is much greater
than θought.
Gradability of D-modals, which is mysterious within quantificational semantics for
these expressions, receives a simple and clean account in the scalar theory.
4 Nouwen’s Puzzle Revisited
4.1 Basic Account
The scalar semantics gives us an immediate solution to the Puzzle in the case of the
mid-scalar items want, ought, and should. I’ll illustrate mostly with want.
(24) a. The minimum height that Sammy wants to be is 6′.
b. The maximum height that Sammy wants to be is 6′8′′.
The semantics sketched in the last section assigns these the following truth-conditions:
(25) a. J(24a)K = 1 iff min(λd[E(Sammy is d−tall)) ≥ θwant]) = 6′
b. J(24b)K = 1 iff max(λd[E(Sammy is d−tall)) ≥ θwant]) = 6′8′′
Whether numerical expressions receive an “at least” or an “exactly” interpre-
tation, these truth-conditions are not trivial. The correct interpretation is generated
most straightforwardly if we adopt an “exactly” interpretation, though. To see what
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the world would have to be like for both of the sentences in (24) to be true, consider
Table 3. (25a) and (25b) require that the expected utility of Sammy’s being exactly
d-tall reaches θwant for the first time at d = 6′, that it meets or exceeds θwant at
d = 6′8′′, and is less than θwant for every d > 6′8′′. Not only are these truth-conditions
satisfiable, they appear to be precisely what the sentences in (24) mean: the least
height that is desirable by Sammy’s lights is 6′, and the greatest is 6′8′′.
Interpreted according to the scalar semantics argued for here, examples (24)
do not receive trivial interpretations comparable to those generated by the standard
semantics forD-modals. The contrast with quantificational theories is due essentially
to the fact that we are no longer universally quantifying some set of good possibilities.
Instead the semantics instructs us to examine the relevant proposition to ensure
that it is sufficiently desirable, without excluding the possibility that incompatible
propositions are also desirable. Not surprisingly, this fact generates many different
predictions; for example, as this example makes clear, we predict that it is possible
for Sammy to have numerous logically incompatible desires. See Lassiter 2011:
§§5-6 for arguments that this is a welcome prediction, and consideration of various
other logical differences between the standard semantics and the scalar alternative.6
4.2 Two Kinds of Maximal Requirements
While maximum requirement sentences with modals such as should and ought
operate like the example just given, similar sentences with logically stronger D-
modals have strikingly different interpretations.7 Compare the following:
(26) a. The earliest Sam should/ought to/wants to arrive at the party is 8PM.
“Sam should not arrive earlier than 8PM”
b. The earliest Sam must/is required to/has to arrive at the party is 8PM.
“Sam isn’t required to arrive earlier than 8PM”
6 This solution has to be modified slightly for the logically stronger D-modals must, required, and have
to, which — on the analysis of Lassiter (2011) — require both that their propositional argument φ
be very good and that all ways of realizing its negation be fairly bad. With an exactly meaning for
numerals and degrees, we end up with truth-conditions that are too strong for sentences like The
minimum number of dishes that you must bring to the potluck is 2: instead of a minimum requirement
the predicted meaning is a precise requirement. Space limitations prevent me from going the details
here, but it is possible to capture the truth-conditions of these examples by using an “at least” meaning
for degrees and numerals in these cases (which, recall, we’re assuming is freely available in addition
to the “exactly” meaning, due to free enrichment by a max operator or something with the same
effect). The net result is an entailment that the expected utility function drops off very sharply below
the minimum requirement. This captures the meaning of these sentences as well as the difference
between them and similar cases with weaker modals such as ought.
7 I owe Rick Nouwen (p.c.) for the observation that sentences like (26b) have this reading.
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(26a) is what we would expect from the above discussion, but (26b) needs explaining:
it seems to suggest that arriving after 8PM is acceptable and that arriving before
8PM is not, almost like a minimum requirement.
Note, however, that this contrast matches up perfectly with an independently
motivated difference in semantic strength: the modals in (26b) are logically stronger
than the ones in (26a) (Sloman 1970; Horn 1972, 1989; von Fintel & Iatridou 2008).
While a detailed account of (26) goes beyond the scope of this paper, I think it can
be accounted for. First, the reading that the previous discussion leads us to expect
for (26b) does appear when we set up a favorable context, for example:
(27) My birthday party will be in a small venue. The maximum number of people
that must be there is 40.
(27) clearly indicates that no more than 40 may attend. (The expected reading of
(26b) is also available in a favorable context, especially with stress on EARLIEST.)
Second, the prominent reading of (26b) and examples like it generally indicate
speaker uncertainty about the precise requirement. This is clear in (28):
(28) The fastest Sam has to drive to get home on time is 70mph. But he might be
able to get home if he drives a bit slower, I’m not sure.
In other words, sentences like (26b) and (28) are not interpreted as minimum re-
quirements per se. Rather, they indicate that there is some uncertain (minimum)
requirement d, and the value given is the maximum value of d that is epistemically
possible by the speaker’s lights: “I’m certain that Sam doesn’t have to drive faster
than 70mph to get home on time”. This may seem surprising, but it makes sense
in light of the fact that even unmodalized sentences with minimum and maximum
frequently have epistemic interpretations (Nouwen 2010a). For example:
(29) The maximum amount of money that Sam has is $50.
(29) does not mean that Sam has exactly $50 as we might expect, but rather that the
speaker is unsure how much he has, but is sure that it does not exceed $50. Whatever
the correct account of sentences like (29) is, it should carry over to cases like (26b)
and (28). The remaining puzzle, of course, is whether examples like (26a) have an
epistemic interpretation, and if so why not:
(30) The most butter you ought to use in the pie is 200 grams. ? But maybe the
recipe calls for less, I don’t remember.
My judgments are not totally clear, but the reading that the continuation invites does
not strike me as too implausible. To the extent that it is available, we can conclude
that a “maximum possibility” interpretation is generally available for maximum
requirement sentences, giving rise to the misleading appearance that they sometimes
express minimum requirements. I do not, however, know why the epistemic reading
is less prominent in (26a) than with the stronger modals in (26b).
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5 Conclusions
Nouwen’s Puzzle is a serious problem for widely accepted theories of modality
and degree semantics: more or less standard assumptions about these two domains
lead to spectacularly wrong truth-conditions for a class of sentences in which they
interact. This means that standard assumptions about one or both of these domains
must be revised. I suggested that modal semantics should be our main target.
Modals are usually treated as restricted quantifiers over possible worlds, but a
number of puzzles about missing inferences, interactions with fine-grained infor-
mation, and grammatical gradability suggest that the right semantics for the modals
which are affected by Nouwen’s Puzzle should be non-monotonic and scalar. I
argued for a semantics for deontic, bouletic, and teleological modals which treats
them as operators which check whether the expected utility of their proposition
argument meets or exceeds a threshold value — just as gradable adjectives do. This
proposal resolves the problems noted for quantificational theories and gives us a
simple solution to Nouwen’s Puzzle. The fact that minimum and maximum re-
quirements — which are deeply puzzling for quantificational theories — receive an
immediate account within a theory of modal semantics which was proposed for
independent reasons is a strong argument in favor of the new account.
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